A state monopoly over a scarce natural resource under open access can arguably reduce the costs of supply by constraining rent dissipation. A monopoly over the collection and trading of sand was formed in Hong Kong by legislation in 1935 in the wake of disputes between sandmen and villagers and imminent shortages of sand. Arguably, a monopoly at this stage of Hong Kong's development was a better alternative to merely defining rights over sand extraction in terms of the transaction costs of enforcement. During the 1950s and 1960s, when Hong Kong's economy and construction industry began to boom, the monopoly's existence was further justified due to the politics of China being the sole source of Hong Kong's sand supply.
Introduction
The words of Hayek as quoted above pertain to the type of monopolies. In this paper, which investigates the genesis and destruction of a sand monopoly, reference will be made to some government-regulated monopolies that enjoy economies of scale, earn profits and crosssubsidize unprofitable services. There are also many examples of government departments providing monopoly services (like fire services) which do not charge a fee or (like water supplies) which charge on a cost-recovery basis, but they do not trade on other things in the economy.
The state itself is, in fact, a monopoly of protection. The question is whether a state trading firm in a building material, sand, is sustainable. The discussion inevitably involves a cost dimension in relation to scale economies but the practical socio-ecological background is not so much cost of sand but the policy need to constrain rent dissipation in a de facto open access resource. Our chosen focus is whether a monopoly can solve a tragedy of the common problem; and our answer is no, even though theory would suggest that a granting of exclusive rights will result in optimal extraction. The question is Coasian: whether a state trading monopoly or state-regulated monopoly was a better institutional alternative, bearing in mind that there was econometric evidence that the latter did enjoy economies of scale in Hong Kong and survived as profit-making concerns.
Building construction and many industrial processes consume a lot of sand. In the making of concrete, sand is required to mix with cement and water. Sand is used to fill in the spaces left by stones and cement 1 . In Asia, river sand is preferred by contractors in making high-strength concreter and mortar. Sand naturally exposed on beaches or river banks can simply be removed using simple methods. Natural sand can also be found on seabed or river bed and dredging or siphoning is required to excavate it. Finally, sand can also be obtained by mechanically breaking up rocks. Beach sand can be captured or replenished by such engineering efforts as weir construction but the rate of exploitation must be carefully controlled.
In the policy arena environmental protection, the conservation of river and marine sand within a given territory has become a major sustainable concern. Ecological economists have paid much attention to measure its costs (Kim et al 2008) . Governments often make laws and regulations to limit their exploitation because uncontrolled mining of coastal and riparian sand could not only cause ecological but also social problems, as violence would be used to appropriate state resources when competition becomes fierce.
To avoid or control these problems, the standard government practice is to limit sand excavation by law or administrative fiat to licensees. However, the most drastic practice is to This article reconstructs the neglected history of a sand monopoly and seeks to evaluate the conjecture that it served the purpose of keeping sand prices low as a social policy. Special attention has been paid to the likelihood of scale economies, which lends support to the presence of a monopoly.
Theoretical context: property rights, monopolies and transaction costs
The discussion on this ecological resource is informed by theories on property rights, monopolies and Coasian transaction cost.
Property rights
In mainstream economics, it is 'received theory" that the establishment of exclusive property rights over natural resources could not only limit rent dissipation by curtailing access but also Sand should not be an exception as it is also in short supply. It is true that renewable resources theoretically can be treated differently than minerals, sand in this case. However, the nature of sand and sand mining is also interesting in one aspect. Unlike lining organisms, say, fish or human beings (who can be subject to slavery), but like gold (Umbeck 1981), sand can neither "adapt" to human intrusion nor negotiate with its own conservation. Its protection, as in the case of trees, lies entirely on the will and wisdom of property management, if any, as regards access control and investment. But unlike goldmines where exclusive rights are usually granted if not created (Umbeck 1981 ), marine sand is scattered all over coastline where in other regions of the world, it probably is not considered to be a scarcity problem. This makes the Hong Kong study unique. Because of the hectic construction activities on this insular city region, sand became a scarce commodity. Depletion of that could be similar to the depletion of any minerals which are usually treated to be much more valuable to be protected by the country where the minerals are found. The laws in those countries will be explicitly structured to prevent over exploitation. On the distinction between renewable versus mineral resources, the difference could be a matter of formulation. Instead of aiming at maximum yield, exploitation should aim for sustainable yield. Again, the question would be, what type of institution that will be best to provide for a sustainable yield.
On the distinction between renewable versus mineral resources, the difference could be a matter of formulation. Instead of aiming at maximum yield, exploitation should aim for sustainable yield. Again, the question would be, what type of institution that will be best to provide for a sustainable yield.
The standard approach to economic research following the above line of thinking focuses on the prices of the resources. This paper adopts that approach and examines if the sand monopoly had an impact on price. This concern with prices should be viewed in light of the considerations that prices are amenable to empirical analysis, as prices are observable.
Monopolies
Pigovian economists have long taken up arms against monopolies as a type of market failure on the basis of "efficiency". The three types of market failure were external effects; public goods, and monopoly. Each type of market failure involves an efficiency problem, such as an inequality between marginal valuation (MV) and marginal cost (MC). Any government policy seeking to distinguish between the two may or may not achieve the equity rule, which requires distinguishing between average revenue (AR) and average cost (AC). The constant marginal cost monopoly can be driven to produce at an efficient (MV=MC) equilibrium, which is also the break-even (AR=AC) point. 2 There are several libertarian approaches for defending a monopoly. First, to punish a monopoly is the same as punishing a firm that is successful. This has a "disincentive effect".
Second, most arguments against monopolies are based on a static view of the economy. In reality, facing potential competition, monopolies will push costs down and lower prices to discourage rivals from entering the market. The shifting down of the supply functions can be explained in terms of the differences between Coasian and Schumpeterian economics (Lai and Lorne 2014). The latter focuses on institutional reforms that facilitate a more efficient identification of parties to contract, negotiation, bargaining, etc., so that the maximum welfare under a given set of demands and cost conditions is attained. The former considers efficiency in transactions under given cost conditions less important than innovation, which is the real driving force of the economy. Innovate or die.
In this paper, there is no a priori vale assumption that that economic efficiency should not be the sole or even decisive consideration. The 1933 state franchising of trams, public buses, and ferries, which, in a way, departed from the establishment of London Transport in Britain, was instituted at about the same time the sand monopoly was created. But only the 2 The rising marginal cost monopoly can also be driven to produce at the efficient (MV=MC) equilibrium, which is above the break-even point. Political pressures tend to move the monopoly to the break-even point by sacrificing some efficiency. The decreasing cost monopoly (often called a "natural monopoly") cannot break even and, in fact, would result in a loss if it is forced to produce at the efficient point (MV=MC). This is the key efficiency reason for nationalization (the state taking over ownership), as in the case of water supplies and telecommunications. Public policies forcing or bargaining to induce a constant MC monopoly to produce at an efficient level of output are feasible, as that is identical to the break-even solution. No public subsidy is necessary for attaining an efficient output. Public policies forcing or bargaining to induce a rising MC monopoly to produce at an efficient level of output are also feasible, as the firms can still retain some abnormal profit. However, pro-labour groups would tend to pressure the state to require firms to produce at (greater) break-even and less-than-socially-efficient levels. Public policies forcing or bargaining to induce a falling MC (or "natural") monopoly to produce at an efficient level of output are not feasible for private firms unless there they are given state subsidies. Either the profit-maximizing or break-even level of production is feasible for the firm, but neither is sufficiently efficient due to underproduction. This kind of monopoly is particularly susceptible to nationalization or direct state operation. last was terminated by a decision of the same administration that formed it. This case study in this context was a diagnosis of the problems that led to its destruction.
There are three prevailing views in the literature on the "state monopoly," "state trading monopoly," or "government monopoly". One view is that it is always or tends to be 
1991, Lu 1999).
It is possible that rent-seeking can completely dissipate the monopoly rent. However, the focus of the paper is on whether the tragedy of common problem can be solved by the granting of (a particular type of) monopoly. This paper did not dispute the existence of social costs to the farmers and other users of sand (e.g. beachgoers) or whether regulation was deemed necessary.
It does take issue with the specific mode of monopoly chosen. Hong Kong's franchised bus and ferry companies, which are privately, rather than government, run, are cases in point (Lai, Chau, and Cheung 2012). The starting point of this paper on whether a given state monopoly raised or lowered prices is an empirical question.
Informed by Coasian economics, it holds that any public interest justification for state 3 In the age of liberalization, the general tendency is to privatise state monopolies so that they act according to market principles and, hence, become more efficient (see, for instance, Morgan (1992), Fielding and Klein (1993)). One of the supporting tenets is that state control of its own monopolies is hopelessly ineffective (see Chaudry (2000)). Prager's (1994) idea that a government monopoly can be more efficient than a regulated private monopoly is a rare one. intervention, granted valid, did not entail the creation of a sand monopoly in the form it assumed as the only policy option.
Transaction costs
Generally, transaction costs in the tradition of Coase (1960) are costs that cannot be modelled by a neo-classical production function, or costs of institutions (Cheung 1998 this incident are still unknown. 10 The next occasion, however, triggered a chain of government responses.
In August 1920, excessive sand mining of coastal sand bars in Mui Wo was reported.
Eric William Hamilton, the Assistant District Officer of the Southern District, drew up a
Memorandum on the Supply of Sand for Building Purpose, which described the problems of coastal erosion, as landowners allowed contractors that held permits from the Building Authority to take sand from their lands and urged the government to formulate a "definite policy of dealing with the matter."
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Hamilton's memorandum was circulated to the Land Office and Public Works Department, whose officials, along with those in the District Office, South, agreed that "sand deposit should be controlled," that " [t] he working of the deposit should be carefully regulated and any junks found taking it away without a permit dealt with severely," but that a "permit should not [be] [sic] restricted to Government Contractors as it will only be an inducement for them to sell sand to other Contractors or use it on private works that they may be engaged [on]
[sic]". 12 After resuming the land at Mui Wo, Hamilton carried on proposing tighter restrictions on sand taking. 13 Hamilton's proposal was approved by the Governor, and the drafting of a new government notification was underway. The result of this discussion was not yet known though, as the government's tendency to tighten up the restrictions on sand-taking was, after all, apparent. One of the subjects which used to excite much feeling in the Chinese countryside was the disturbance of graves. In 1930 this occurred at Tai Wan in Lamma, on the big sand bank later excavated by Father Finn, once a leading local centre of Bronze Agriculture.
The sand diggers had cut away so much sand that coffins buried 2 feet deep in the bank were sticking out, and their contents could be seen.
One crime that often came before my court in the office was stealing sand for building.
Sand collecting was regulated by a system of permits, allowing junk masters to collect sand at selected beaches, each junk having its own collecting beach. Sand shortage was serious from 1924 to 1926, when concrete was coming into fashion for building, and between the demands of builders, and the interests of New Territory cultivators of land behind the sand banks, there was acute conflict, which sometimes grew into a shooting match. One such conflict took place at Sha Lo Wan in Northwest Lantau; this village was very jealous of the fine sandbank protecting its fields, and had licensed gun owners; so the crews, who had no permit for that beach, were driven off without their sand.
According to a 1933 report on the New Territories,
The demand for sand continues to be keen. 294 permits were issued as against 249 for beaches in the District by sand thieves continues to cause concern. In spite of much hard work and extra precautions on the part of Police launches, and heavy sentences on offenders when convicted, the nuisance is still only partially checked. Maximum penalties are now being exacted in an effort to stamp out this offence. 15 During the 1934 Budget debate, the Colonial Secretary told the Legislative Council that due to "the rapid exhaustion of the sand supplies of the Colony," a scheme would be undertaken to be laid before the Council at an early date. It was anticipated that the scheme would "not only pay for itself but will bring in a small addition to the revenue" when it was in full operation. 16 The public policy concern over this state of affairs, notably the use of violence involving firearms to demarcate the rights over the supposedly scanty resource, was surely one of the key reasons why a sand law and sand monopoly came into existence in 1935. The classic case for a state monopoly to constrain transaction costs/rent dissipation was ripe. Note, however, that the District Officers were not geographers and neither they nor the lawmakers had the benefit of having surveyed sand deposits in the colony. China. An exception was the creation of the "kei wei" (inter-tidal fish/shrimp ponds) in Mai Po Marshes, which has become an international migratory bird conservation and watching site. Nearly all public works were connected with military or occupation purposes, notably the expansion of the Kai Tak Airport; construction of a road to the top of Tai Mo Shan to serve a military radar station; extension of the Clear Water Bay Road in the direction of Sai Kung to fight communist guerrillas, the building of concrete pillboxes at Luk Keng to counter an Allied landing; the erection of a war memorial for Japanese war casualties on the summit of a knoll in Mount Cameron; and addition of a Japanese style tower to the Governor House. All such engineering works involved the extensive use of concrete and fill materials but unfortunately we know nothing about the means and quantity of sand exploitation. 21 The PWD was " I understand that the Government Stores are at present re-organizing the sand supply, and will soon be in a position to sell sand for building purposes. I understand also that a It is however clear that sand costs, which are almost entirely transportation by junk, will be very high, compared with prewar lev[e]ls, since the critical shortage of junks has raised their charges to from $80-$120 per day.
Creation and Evolution of the Sand Monopoly
In view of the deterrent effect on rebuilding of high building costs, of which sand is a factor, although not the major one, I would recommend that for the next 12 months, or so, the cost of sand should be kept almost at cost; as transportation costs decreases with greater competition amongst junk owners, the cost price will drop and a greater profit become available as revenue. 25 Upon request by the Financial Secretary about this complaint, the Controller of Stores 26 agreed that the monopoly's profits could be reduced:
Prewar selling price was approximately 70% above cost and on this basis we made a profit of $250,000 a year.
Cost prices, due mainly to increased transport charges, will be considerably higher now, and the revenue (if the 70% profit basis is adhered to) will be proportionately large.
This, plus a larger building programme, should bring a substantial return, estimated at $1,250,000 a year.
It might meet both sides if percentage over cost was reduced by half. 27 It was eventually agreed that the profits would be reduced to 35%. The marketing of sand is a government monopoly, introduced to conserve beaches. The supply has not kept pace with the demand due in part at least to the shortage of junks required to collect it. Jobs have been held up through the lack of sand, and lorries have stood many hours at sand depots waiting for supplies. This has caused increases in building costs. 28 is something radically wrong in the operation of the Sand monopoly." 37 The Colonial Secretary replied that "queues and delays" would not recur. 38 In 1956, another lawmaker questioned the government, complaining about the soaring cost of government sand prices, as well as the poor quality of its sand, and suggested the establishment of a Sand Board represented by building specialists. 39 The government's reply was positive, 40 but a follow-up was never made.
When the exposed sources of sand were near exhaustion, marine sand found on the that "I have information from a reliable source that the supply of sand within our territories will be exhausted within two years." 41 The Financial Secretary replied that:
I may say that when this matter was brought to my attention over twelve months ago, the forecast was not two years; it was six months. But since then, intensive searches all over the Colony for suitable building sand have been carried out, and the particular deposit to which I referred four weeks ago looks as if it will keep us going for some time we shall be very pleased indeed if somebody can go and get it. As I said before, no difficulties will be placed in the way 42 Although the survey revealed substantial new deposits, which were tappable by the use of additional modern equipment, it became clear that if demand remained at its current high level and, even more so, if it continued to grow as it showed signs of doing, it would be necessary to import large quantities of sand if the Colony's own reserves were not to be run down rapidly.
At this time the contractor was approached by the Kwangtung Metals and Minerals
Export Company with a suggestion that the Colony should make a bulk purchase of sand from China. Agreement was reached on the purchase of 2.2 million cubic yards from Sha Yu Chung off the shores of Mirs Bay, the total cost being $8.50 a cubic yard…This contract received the approval of the Finance Committee of this Council. It was fortunate that we were able to make arrangements for these additional bulk supplies for demand.
When considering this contract, [the] [sic] Finance Committee expressed some concern
at the fact that the contract had been so long in the hands of one firm and suggested that consideration should be given to some arrangement that would bring it to an end or put the award once again on a competitive tender rather than a negotiated basis.
The most serious consideration was given during 1963 to this problem, but in the event at the beginning of 1964, Government came to the conclusion that in the circumstances it must recommend the award of a negotiated contract. This course was finally adopted i.e. beach and cultivation protection plus the need for building a strategic reserve. Yet, the China factor was considered critical, and the government ruled out the feasibility of finding another good supplier that could obtain sand from China.
It is possible that, given adequate time for preparation (and we examined the problem and reached the point of decision in plenty of time) another firm could acquire, and would be capable of operating efficiently, adequate dredging equipment and lighterage in spite of its high capital cost. There is some room for doubt, however. Then, we are not the only parties to the present arrangement. Yau Wing are known to be acceptable to the Chinese authorities for the conduct of operations in Chinese territory and the present arrangements have been working well and, I believe, to the satisfaction of both parties. There would seem therefore to be potential dangers in changing them. We could not expect the Chinese authorities to accept automatically just any firm we might choose to select by tender to operate in China.
The focus of this paper is however not on the exogenous conditions affecting Hong Kong sand supply but whether the establishment of a monopoly as a state trading firm could solve an earlier ecological problem. Indeed, as the supply condition change drastically due to the abundant supply of sand from China and the new technology that anyone (including the government) could use to expand the supply of sand, the issue of the ecological implication of over-exploitation of a common resource became moot.
The government also ruled out the possibility of it collecting sand on its own or abandoning its sand monopoly and letting the free market supply the sand. There could not be any free market given that China would only supply sand to Yau Wing. However, the demand for sand and, hence, reliance on China was not as high as expected. 45 The key issue of the political debates over the sand monopoly was predicated on the belief that had the supply from China been cut, Hong Kong would have had to stop building its reinforced concrete high-rise buildings. The reality was that while China supplemented the local sand supply, the deposits of sand in Hong Kong were rather plentiful. The China factor, which favoured Yau Wing, must be seen in light of the official 1965 statements examined earlier: the real reason for relying on China was not due to a shortage in the local supply of sand, as new sources were "trappable by the use of additional modern equipment," but to the desire to stockpile sand in its natural state. To what extent this was a strategic political consideration is something for historians to ponder. In fact, Yiu Wing's study discovered a lot of new local sources of sand. Although it was a known fact that only Yiu Wing might have obtained its sand from China, the argument that only it had access to modern capital was hard to believe.
Facts against the Sand Monopoly
The pre-war concept of the monopoly was based on the idea that it could regulate sand mining and, thereby, minimise conflicts between sandmen and villagers was essential because local sand supplies were limited. Our study, based on published official reports not adduced by the official statements in favour of the monopoly in the Legislative Council, found that post-war enforcement by the sand monopoly was ineffective and that local sand supplies were huge.
Pre-war lawmakers assumed that sand could only be obtained by manually removing sand from sand bars and had no idea of how much marine sand was deposited on the seabed.
Enforcement Ineffective
The Sand Monopoly did not effectively control sand mining. From both private writings and official reports, we can see that the main local source of sand was initially sandy beaches in the New Territories. This was natural as the removal of exposed sand from beaches is a direct method. It is highly likely that the method of removal onto barges as transport tools was simply manual with little help of machinery. However, while this method entailed low private cost of exploitation, it incurred high public cost of enforcement. As no machinery was needed, this had to be the quickest and most profitable method of exploitation for both licensed and illegal sand excavators. Entry to the sand removal industry had to be easy. As tedious concurrent permission of the District Lands Office and local village representatives had also to be sought, enforcement of the sand law by the sand monopoly was costly. The most persuasive proof of an ample local sand supply was the source of filler for the Port and Airport Strategy (PADS), which commenced in 1989 and was completed in 1998. The filler came from marine sand deposits. During PADS, most of the world's sand dredgers were employed in Hong Kong to pump sand from its deep seas and used as landfill to build Chek Lap Kok International Airport and related projects.
Besides relying on dredging, sand could be produced by machine. The technology involved became so sophisticated from an engineering standpoint that it was beyond the competence of a department that specialized only in purchasing and controlling the inventory of purchased materials. There were many local granite quarries from which solid rocks mined could be crushed to produce sand. The well-known quarries worked from the 1960s to the early 1990s were those at Tai Sheung Tok (Anderson Road Quarry), Shek O Road Picnic Bay (Sok Kwo Wan, Lamma Island) (Shui On); Tai Shek Kwu, Shatin; Shatin Wai, Shatin; and Mount Butler (government quarry). This was the most capital intensive and costly method of producing sand but justified by escalation in property values. Enforcement cost was low as huge fixed cost of entry limited the number of entrants and activities were carried out on plants on land. This method involved huge private cost of production but low public cost of enforcement.
The government entered into contracts with quarry operators for manufactured sand, but allowed them to also sell sand directly to builders. A contract for the supply of "manufactured sand" was signed between the colonial government and the Pioneer Concrete
Group to operate from 1 October 1976. By this time, the recreational value of sandy beaches and the cost of sand dredging to marine fish culture and water quality had risen substantially, as evidenced by the creation of the Environment Branch in the Government Secretariat. During the 1970s, as for sand dredging, contracts were awarded to supply sand "to Government from
waters not adjacent to the coastline of Hong Kong," which meant sources controlled by China.
However, when PADS was implemented, the Colonial Government was quick to resort to sand deposited in the deep sea rather than relying on China alone.
Wholesale Prices of Sand Fell after 1981
The most striking fact is that after the dissolution of the sand monopoly in 1981, wholesale prices of sand actually fell. which simply raised prices without innovation. Its demise makes economic sense.
